

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14

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P R 191644Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 225

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 8689

GENEVA FOR CSCE AND SALT DELS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: US OPENING STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF US OPENING STATEMENT AS SLIGHTLY
AMENDED IN AD HOC GROUP MEETINGS OCTOBER 16 AND 18.

BEGIN TEXT:

US OPENING STATEMENT IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. MY GOVERNMENT WARMLY WELCOMES THE BEGINNING OF
THESE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES
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AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL
EUROPE.

2. A GREAT CHALLENGE LIES BEFORE US. CENTRAL EUROPE

IS THE FOCUS OF ONE OF THE GREATEST CONCENTRATIONS OF MILITARY POWER IN PEACETIME HISTORY. FOR MORE THAN TWO DECADES, THE ARMED FORCES OF EAST AND WEST HAVE CONFRONTED EACH OTHER THERE. THIS CONFRONTATION HAS GIVEN RISE TO ABIDING APPREHENSION AND CONCERN. AND IT REPRESENTS A FORMIDABLE BURDEN ON US ALL.

3. THE TIME HAS COME TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION. SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO SEEK TO REDUCE THE SCALE AND INTENSITY OF THE CONFRONTATION.

4. THIS IS SURELY ONE OF THE CENTRAL TASKS OF OUR TIME. IT IS ALSO A DELICATE ONE. THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN EUROPE IS UNSATISFACTORY IN MANY WAYS, BUT WE WOULD NOT WISH IT TO WORSEN THROUGH UNWISE MEASURES. THEREFORE, WE MUST CARRY OUT OUR TASK IN SUCH A WAY AS TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE, NOT WEAKEN THEM. THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITY IN EUROPE IS A DELICATE ONE, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL WE WILL HAVE TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND STEP BY STEP, REALIZING THAT ALL PARTIES WILL WISH TO BE ASSURED OF THEIR SECURITY AT EACH STAGE.

5. WE DO NOT EXPECT THIS TASK TO BE EASY. THESE NEGOTIATIONS REPRESENT A RADICAL NEW DEPARTURE IN INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY, THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING QUITE LIKE THEM BEFORE. BOTH IN THE SUBJECT MATTER THEY WILL ADDRESS AND IN THEIR PATTERN OF PARTICIPATION, THEY BREAK NEW GROUND. BUT THEIR IMPORTANCE JUSTIFIES AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT ON THE PART OF US ALL.

6. MY GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS A PRACTICAL ONE. WE ARE INTERESTED IN CONCRETE RESULTS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE NOT SETTING ANY ARTIFICIAL DEADLINES FOR OURSELVES. WE CONSIDER THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD MOVE AHEAD AT AN EVEN TEMPO, KEEPING PACE WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITHOUT AN ARTIFICIAL, PRE-ORDAINED PATTERN OF BREAKS.

7. FURTHER, WE WILL STRIVE FOR A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE. WE ARE HERE TO PERFORM A SPECIFIC TASK. WE ARE INTERESTED IN SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS WE WILL HAVE TO ADDRESS TOGETHER. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN POLEMICAL DEBATES. MANY ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER ARE CONTROVERSIAL, AND VIEWPOINTS WILL DIVERGE. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONTEXT IF ALL PARTICIPANTS MADE

IT A CONSCIOUS RULE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT MATTER AND PRESENT THEIR POINTS OF VIEW IN TERMS OF CONCRETE, OBJECTIVE FACTS, AND NOT IN TERMS OF THE PRESUMED INTENTIONS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

8. THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH THEY CONTAIN UNIQUE FEATURES AND WILL BREAK NEW GROUND, ARE NOT AN ISOLATED PHENOMENON. THEY DO NOT TAKE PLACE IN A VACUUM. MY GOVERNMENT VIEWS THEM AS TAKING PLACE WITHIN A CONTEXT WHICH INCLUDES A NUMBER OF FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPEFUL PROSPECTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IMPROVEMENTS HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATED IN THE SITUATION IN BERLIN WHICH WE HOPE WILL ELIMINATE THAT CITY AS THE SOURCE OF FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE CSCE HAS BEGUN IN GENEVA AND WILL, WE HOPE, LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. THE LAST FEW YEARS HAVE SEEN A NUMBER OF HIGHLY IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, NOTABLY THE SALT AGREEMENTS SIGNED LAST YEAR BETWEEN MY GOVERNMENT AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH BEGIN TO LIMIT THE TWO POWERS' ARSENALS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SALT NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING ON A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF SIGNING IT IN 1974, AS WELL AS ON THEIR SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION. FINALLY, WE ARE WITNESSING INCREASINGLY NORMAL, INCREASINGLY PRODUCTIVE, BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF EAST AND WEST.

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9. THE ENTERPRISE ON WHICH WE ARE NOW EMBARKING PROVIDES US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE TO MOVE FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION ON A PROBLEM AREA OF KEY IMPORTANCE FOR ALL OF US. THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS THE PRODUCT OF HISTORY. IT IS A RESULT OF PAST TENSIONS, AND AT THE SAME TIME A CAUSE OF TENSION. IN KEEPING WITH THE BUSINESS-LIKE AND OBJECTIVE SPIRIT WHICH I HAVE SUGGESTED SHOULD GOVERN THE TONE OF OUR DISCUSSIONS, WE DO NOT WISH TO ENGAGE IN DEBATES OVER HOW OR WHY THE PRESENT SITUATION AROSE. WE SHOULD MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE TASK OF SEEKING TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION IN WAYS THAT WILL BENEFIT ALL OF US. THUS, WE HOPE TO REDUCE THE RISKS FOR ALL ARISING FROM MISCALCULATION, MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISINTERPRETATION OF ACTIONS OF EITHER SIDE. OUR MAIN TASK WILL BE TO ACHIEVE A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS. IF WE CAN ACHIEVE THIS GOAL-- AND MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES WE CAN -- THEN AN MBFR AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS WILL BE A HIGHLY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO STRENGTHENING PEACE, SECURITY AND

MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE AND TO IMPROVED, MORE FRUITFUL RELATIONS AMONG US ALL. SUCH A RESULT WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL OUR PEOPLES. WITH THIS PROSPECT BEFORE US, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TEST THE WILLINGNESS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS AND TO RESOLVE THE HARD, CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- AND THUS ARE A VALID TEST OF THE GENUINENESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE.

10. OUR NEGOTIATIONS WERE PRECEDED EARLIER THIS YEAR IN VIENNA BY PREPARATORY TALKS. IN THOSE TALKS, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES WERE AGREED AS GUIDANCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS:

-- MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

-- THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE
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AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

-- IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AN UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED TO CONDUCT THEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITH DUE REGARD TO ITS COMPLEXITY.

-- SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE, AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

-- ANY TOPIC RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER MAY BE INTRODUCED FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

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11. WE BELIEVE THESE AGREED GUIDELINES FORM A SOUND BASIS FOR OUR WORK. THE PROPOSALS WE WILL MAKE DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND OUR APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THESE GUIDELINES.

12. IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, WE ALSO AGREED ON PROCEDURES FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE FEEL THAT NO FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURAL MATTERS IS NEEDED AT THIS TIME. OUR TASK IS NOW TO ADDRESS QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. WE BELIEVE THAT DAY-TO-DAY PROCEDURAL BUSINESS, SUCH AS THE SCHEDULING OF MEETINGS, CAN BE HANDLED IN APPROPRIATE WAYS.

13. THE PREPARATORY TALKS RECORDED AGREEMENT ON A FURTHER POINT: NAMELY, THE REGION ON WHICH THE CONFIDENTIAL

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NEGOTIATIONS WILL FOCUS. THAT REGION WAS DEFINED IN THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE AS CENTRAL EUROPE.

14. BASED ON THE POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN US WHICH I HAVE JUST ENUMERATED, I SHOULD LIKE NOW TO OUTLINE FOR YOU THE GENERAL APPROACH OF MY GOVERNMENT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

15. IN OUR VIEW, THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS THE SIZE, CHARACTER, AND ACTIVITIES OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

16. WE AIM TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THOSE FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO LEAD TO A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WHILE MAINTAINING UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

17. WE AIM AT AFFECTING THE CHARACTER OF THESE MILITARY FORCES BY REDUCING THOSE ASPECTS OR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORCES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO US BECAUSE OF THEIR INTRINSIC CAPABILITIES. AGREEMENTS ON TOPICS OF THIS KIND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE.

18. FINALLY, WE AIM AT DEALING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE MILITARY FORCES IN A MANNER WHICH WILL MINIMIZE THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION, SURPRISE, OR THEIR USE IN A DESTABILIZING MANNER. AGREEMENTS ON MEASURES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WOULD ALSO ENHANCE STABILITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

19. WE HAVE AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE ONE WHICH PRESERVES UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY. NO PARTICIPANT OR GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS SHOULD GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM AN AGREEMENT. IT IS THE CONSIDERED VIEW OF MY GOVERNMENT THAT THE AIMS I HAVE OUTLINE ABOVE WITH RESPECT TO THE SIZE, CHARACTER AND ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE CAN AND SHOULD BE REALIZED IN A MANNER THAT PRESERVES UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR MY COUNTRY AND ALL ITS ALLIES WHEN AP-
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PROPRIATE ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF SIGNIFICANT, OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES AFFECTING THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DISPARITIES WHICH WE VIEW AS OPERATING TO OUR DISADVANTAGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE DISPARITIES IN MANPOWER, IN THE CHARACTER OF FORCES, AND IN GEOGRAPHY.

20. LET ME ELABORATE ON THESE. IN MANPOWER, THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE MORE GROUND PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN DOES NATO. WE CONSIDER THAT TO NARROW AND FINALLY ELIMINATE THIS DISPARITY IN MANPOWER THROUGH MUTUAL REDUCTIONS WOULD IMPROVE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

21. WITH RESPECT TO CHARACTER OF FORCES, THE WARSAW PACT FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF HEAVY ARMOR ATTACK CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I HAVE SAID THAT WE SHALL SEEK TO AVOID DEBATES OVER EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS OR MOTIVES. THEREFORE, I AM NOT REMARKING ON THE POSSIBLE INTENTIONS OF ANYONE WHEN I SAY THAT WE MUST REGARD THIS CONCENTRATION OF HEAVY ARMOR IN THE HEART OF EUROPE AS A CAPABILITY POTENTIALLY ENABLING ATTACK. IT IS AN OBJECTIVE FACT THAT A MARKED IMBALANCE IN TANKS EXISTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

22. WE CONSIDER THAT STABILITY IS ENHANCED WHEN ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THESE TALKS ARE ABLE TO SEE EACH OTHER'S PURPOSE AS A DEFENSIVE ONE, AND WHEN THEY PERCEIVE EACH OTHER'S FORCES TO BE CONFIGURED IN A WAY CONSISTENT WITH DEFENSIVE PURPOSES. A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE ARMoured CAPABILITY OF THE USSR IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, BE CONSISTENT

WITH DEFENSIVE PURPOSES, AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCED STABILITY IN EUROPE.

23. THE THIRD MAJOR DISPARITY TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED -- GEOGRAPHY -- IS ALSO BASIC TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE US AND USSR, WHICH STATION SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, ARE LOCATED AT VASTLY UNEQUAL DISTANCES FROM THE AREA. THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION DIRECTLY AND IMMEDIATELY ADJOINS
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CENTRAL EUROPE. SOVIET FORCES, LOCATED IN SOVIET TERRITORY, HAVE READY ACCESS OVER THE POLISH PLAIN TO THE VERY HEART OF THE AREA. THE US, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS LOCATED AT A GREAT DISTANCE FROM CENTRAL EUROPE AND IS SEPARATED FROM THE AREA BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. THUS, ACCESS TO CENTRAL EUROPE IS FAR MORE DIFFICULT FOR US FORCES. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY HAS THIS CONSEQUENCE FOR MUTUAL REDUCTIONS: ANY SOVIET FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM CENTRAL EUROPE INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN QUICKLY AND EASILY; US FORCES WITHDRAWN TO THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE AN OCEAN AWAY. THIS POINT APPLIES EQUALLY TO REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY. A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS INHERENT INEQUITY IN A MANNER THAT DID NOT RESULT IN ANY DIMINUTION OF OUR SECURITY. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE.

24. IMPLICIT IN ALL THAT I HAVE SAID ON THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THESE MAJOR DISPARITIES IS THE CONCEPT THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST ACHIEVE EQUITABLE RESULTS, ARRIVED AT IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER. IN KEEPING WITH THIS CONCEPT AND WITH THE ACTUAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AT HAND, WE CONSIDER THAT AN ULTIMATE GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR THE GROUND FORCES OF EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

25. OUR APPROACH TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS I HAVE ALREADY SAID, IS A REALISTIC ONE. IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR INITIAL GOAL WOULD HAVE TO BE A MORE MODEST ONE THAN THE ACHIEVEMENT, IN ONE STEP, OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

26. THUS WE CONSIDER THAT OUR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED IN MORE THAN ONE PHASE. THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD FOCUS ON US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THEIR REDUCTION IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, IT

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WOULD BE LOGICAL IF THE TWO LARGEST POWERS WITH FORCES
IN THE AREA SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD. TO FOCUS ON US
AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD GET AT THE HEART OF
THE PROBLEM OF CONFRONTATION OF MILITARY FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE.

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27. IT IS OUR VIEW THAT REDUCTION OF FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE WILL NOT OF ITSELF BE SUFFICIENT TO
RESULT IN GREATER STABILITY. OTHER MEASURES WILL ALSO
BE NEEDED. THESE SHOULD INCLUDE STABILIZING MEASURES,
VERIFICATION MEASURES AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS.

28. FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ONLY THE SIZE AND CHARACTER, BUT ALSO THE
ACTIVITIES OF ARMED FORCES AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE
MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEREFORE, WE
CONSIDER THAT MEASURES AFFECTING
CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE NECESSARY. AS PARTI-
CIPANTS WILL BE AWARE, THIS IS WHAT WE HAD IN MIND
WHEN WE INTRODUCED THE TERM "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" INTO
THE COMMUNIQUE OF LAST JUNE. ACTIVITIES OF THE FORCES,
IN THE AREA, IF THEIR PURPOSE IS AMBIGUOUS, OR IF THEY ARE

CARRIED OUT ON SUCH A SCALE OR IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO BE PER-
CEIVED BY OTHER PARTICIPANTS AS A POTENTIAL THREAT,
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COULD BE DESTABILIZING. AGREED MEASURES RELATING TO
FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ARRANGEMENTS DESIGNED TO REDUCE
THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION, MISUNDERSTANDING
OR MISINTERPRETATION -- THAT IS, WHAT MAY BE TERMED
STABILIZING MEASURES -- WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT CON-
TRIBUTION TO STABILITY IN THE AREA, AND COULD ENHANCE
MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. WE SHALL HAVE A NUMBER OF SUCH
MEASURES TO PROPOSE.

29. IT IS ALSO OUR VIEW THAT APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS
CONCERNING VERIFICATION OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WILL
NEED TO BE AGREED. EACH PARTICIPANT OR GROUP OF PAR-
TICIPANTS WILL WISH TO HAVE ADEUATE ASSURANCE THAT
THE TERMS OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT ARE BEING FAITH-
FULLY CARRIED OUT. THAT WILL CLEARLY BE IN THE
INTERESTS OF ALL. IT WILL BE NECESSARY, THEREFORE,
TO DEAL WITH THIS MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF REDUCTIONS.

30. WE CONSIDER THAT EACH PARTICIPANT WILL ALSO
WISH TO HAVE APPROPRIATE ASSURANCES THAT EACH PARTY
TO POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS WILL REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
WHICH WOULD CIRCUMVENT OR UNDERMINE AN AGREEMENT.
WE WILL NEED TO TAKE THIS MATTER UP IN DETAIL AT A
LATER STAGE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE OUTLINES OF
A POSSIBLE REDUCTION AGREEMENT MAY HAVE BEGUN TO
EMERGE.

31. WE BELIEVE, IN SUM, THAT APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS
AND ASSURANCES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF FORCES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE, REGARDING VERIFICATION OF THE OBSER-
VANCE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT, AND REGARDING MEASURES
TO ASSURE THAT A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIR-
CUMVENTED, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE UNDIMINISHED
SECURTY FOR EACH PARTY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS
SAME PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY,
WE WILL ALSO WISH TO ENSURE THAT AGREED MEASURES IN
CENTRAL EUROPE NOT RESULT IN REDUCED STABILITY OR
SECURITY OUTSIDE THE AREA.

32. FINALLY, AS A LAST MAJOR POINT, I WISH TO REMIND
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YOU OF THE STAEMENT MADE AT THE MAY 14 PLENARY OF THE
PREPARATORY TALKS BY AMBASSADOR QUARLES VAN UFFORD ON
BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT AND THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS REP-

PRESENTED BY MY COLLEAGUES. THAT STATEMENT SAID THAT "THE REPRESENTATIVES OF BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WISH TO POINT OUT THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF HUNGARY IN THESE CONSULTATIONS ARE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE NATURE OF HUNGARY'S PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, DECISIONS, OR AGREED MEASURES OR TO THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTY, AND THAT, IN PARTICULAR, THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS, OR MEASURES MUST BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED DURING THE PENDING NEGOTIATIONS." THIS REPRESENTS OUR CONTINUE INTENTION.

33. I HAVE OUTLINED FOR YOU THE OVERALL AMERICAN APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. AS WILL HAVE BEEN EVIDENT FROM STATEMENTS MADE EARLIER, THIS APPROACH IS SHARED BY OUR ALLIES. OUR GENERAL METHOD OF EXPOSITION OVER THE NEXT WEEKS AND MONTHS WILL BE TO PROCEED FROM THE GENERAL TO THE SPECIFIC. THIS INITIAL EXPOSITION OF OUR APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER HAS DEALT WITH GENERAL CONCEPTS. WE WILL RETURN TO THESE CONCEPTS IN OUR ENSUING DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEXT DAYS. WE HOPE TO ELABORATE ON THEM AND EXAMINE THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS WITH YOU IN INCREASING DETAIL.

34. I WISH TO STRESS IN CLOSING THAT MY GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT WEIGHT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OAL WE SEEK -- A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AT LOWER LEVELS OF FORCES WITH UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY -- IS OF IMMENSE POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE TO US ALL. SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL WOULD SURELY BE REGARDED BY ALL OUR PEOPLES AS A GREAT AND VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO A LASTING PEACE IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS GOAL, IT IS UP TO ALL OF US HERE TO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE IT. AS I STATED EARLIER, MY GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL TEST THE WILLINGNESS

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OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS AND TO RESOLVE THE HARD, CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES IN CENTRAL EUROPE -- AND THUS ARE A VALID TEST OF THE GENUINENESS OF DETENTE IN EUROPE. WE, FOR OUR PART, ARE READY TO MOVE AHEAD.

35. ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE AUSTRIAN AUTHORITIES FOR AGREEING TO HOST OUR CONFERENCE IN VIENNA AND FOR MAKING AVAILABLE FACILITIES TO HELP US IN OUR WORK. THERE COULD BE NO BETTER SITE FOR THIS IMPORTANT CONFERENCE.

END TEXT. HUMES

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